STATE OF TASMANIA v NICOLE LYNN HUMES SHANAHAN CJ
COMMENTS ON PASSING SENTENCE 17 AUGUST 2026
Nicole Lyn Humes you have been convicted, upon your plea of guilty, to two counts of arson contrary to s 268 of the Criminal Code 1924. The first that at Hobart on or about 2 November 2023 you instigated BAH to set fire to a house at [address], and second that at the same place but on 5 November 2023 that you instigated BAH to set fire to a shed at [address].
You were 32 years of age at the time of these crimes. You are now 35 years of age.
Your co-offenders are David Conrad Woolley and your son, BAH,
Mr Woolley was 40 years of age at the date of your offending.
Your son was 15 years old at the time of your offending. Both your co-accused have been sentenced for their part in these crimes.
Mr Woolley, your adult co-offender, has been sentenced by the Full Court following an appeal by the State, in Director of Public Prosecutions v Woolley [2026] TASCCA 1, to a term of imprisonment for four years, and is not eligible for parole until he has served half that term. In sentencing Mr Woolley the Full Court observed at [39], “[t]here is a strong need to impose a sentence which reflects the need to punish the respondent, denounce his conduct and deter him and others from future offending of this nature. He is to be sentenced for two crimes, both involving separate culpability”.
BAH was sentenced for these crimes, among other offences, on 28 May 2024. He was sentenced in the Magistrates Court, as a youth, to a 10-month detention order, commencing on 21 March 2024. That was partially suspended for two months on condition that he not commit an offence punishable by imprisonment for 12 months.
The complainants are Tim and Jane Palfreyman.
In October 2023, you met Mr Woolley on TikTok and subsequently entered into a sexual relationship. Stacey Leggate is the wife of Mr Woolley, they have three children together. Although still married and cohabitating at the time of your offending, Ms Leggate, and Mr Woolley were no longer in a relationship.
In September 2023, Ms Leggate entered into an agreement to rent the property at [address].
That property was owned by the complainants, Mr and Mrs Palfreyman, and the property was insured through Australian Associated Motor Insurers Ltd. Ms Leggate and Mr Woolley lived together at the property, with their children, until 28 September 2023. Mr Woolley was not a party to the rental agreement for the address but was staying at the residence whilst searching for another property in which he could live.
On 28 September 2023, there was an electrical fire contained in the meter box at [address]. This incident resulted in the family vacating the residence, and the property remaining unoccupied thereafter. However, some of the family’s personal belongings remained at the residence.
On or around 1 November 2023, you and Mr Woolley had a phone conversation. During that conversation, Mr Woolley requested that you find someone to burn down the house at [address].
Mr Woolley told you that he had left the front door at [address] open. Shortly after that conversation, you directed your son, BAH, to burn down the house at that address.
Throughout the night of 2 November 2023, Mr Woolley sent text messages to you, requesting you to have the house burnt down that evening.
At approximately 11.30 pm, BAH, his partner, and a number of unknown individuals walked from your residence, to [address]. BAH took approximately 500 mils of petrol in a drink bottle, which he sourced from your lawnmower.
When BAH arrived at [address], he opened the front door of the property and poured petrol over the front door entry way, and across the wooden decking situated at the front of the residence.
BAH then set the fuel alight using a cigarette lighter and fled the scene.
An unknown individual notified emergency services of the fire. The fire was extinguished, however there was extensive fire and smoke damage to the house’s structure and contents. The shed located at the back of the property was not impacted by the fire.
During the commission of this crime, Mr Woolley asked you to provide him with updates regarding the fire, including requesting photos, and information as to the response from emergency services.
You sent Mr Woolley a photo of the fire which was visible from your residence and informed him when fire crews arrived at the property. In the morning of 3 November 2023, Mr Woolley congratulated you on the fire. On 3 November 2023, Mr Woolley requested you have someone burn down the shed, at [address]. Mr Woolley sent you text messages stating:
“Shed is still up, lol half a job xx”,
and:
“There is stuff in the shed of hers to burn, that too please lol xxxxxx.”
Mr Woolley informed you that the shed door was open.
On or around 3 November 2023, you directed BAH to burn down the shed at [address].
Throughout 4 and 5 of November 2023, Mr Woolley repeatedly asked you when the fire would occur.
You informed Mr Woolley that the fire would occur on the night of 5 November 2023.
On 5 November 2023, at approximately 11.30 pm, BAH walked from your property, to [address]. He was carrying with him a small quantity of petrol, which he sourced from your lawnmower.
When BAH arrived at [address], he opened the door of the shed and poured fuel over its interior.
BAH set the fuel alight using a cigarette lighter and fled the scene. An unknown individual notified emergency services of the fire. The fire was extinguished; however, there was extensive fire and smoke damage to the shed’s structure and contents. The wooden fence bordering [address] was also partially burnt by the fire.
During police investigations into these crimes, police lawfully obtained text messages sent between you and Mr Woolley during the relevant period.
On 30 January 2024, you attended the Glenorchy Police Station and participated in an electronically recorded interview.
Under caution you stated that Mr Woolley told you that he was having issues with Ms Leggate, and that she cheated. Mr Woolley told you that he wanted to get karma back on Ms Leggate. You said that you were on the phone with Mr Woolley one night, and he asked you if you had someone to burn the house down. BAH was there at the time and heard the conversation on loudspeaker.
A few nights later, BAH went down and set fire to the house. BAH told you that he opened the door of the house, poured petrol all over the floor, and set it alight, before fleeing the property. Mr Woolley asked you for photos of the fire, you sent these via Snapchat from your lounge room window. You told BAH to go down to the property and “burn her out”.
You said that after instructing BAH to start the fire, you felt bad for months. BAH sourced the petrol from your lawnmower. After the fire to the house, Mr Woolley asked you to arrange for someone to set the shed, at the property alight. Mr Woolley told you, “I want it done now.” On your instructions BAH went back to the property and set the shed on fire. You said you committed these crimes for Mr Woolley, as you were in a relationship with him. You stated that you were the person in the middle, arranging the fires. You asked BAH to start the fires, as he said he would do it, and that he did not care, and that he would take the full blame.
During the fire, you provided Mr Woolley with information as to the response of emergency services, as you could see that response from your lounge room. You said you wish you had never done it and regret it. You said you were truly sorry. You received no financial benefit from these crimes.
Further, you said that BAH received no financial benefit from these crimes, and that you regret having involved him in these crimes. You sent BAH messages following the fires, one of which congratulated him. You were charged and bailed to appear in court.
You initially pleaded not guilty to these crimes in the Hobart Magistrates Court, and you were committed to the Supreme Court of Tasmania on 22 April 2024. The State seek a compensation order pursuant to s 68(1) of the Sentencing Act 1997, in favour of the complainants, and Ms Leggate, in an amount to be assessed.
You have spent no time in custody, in respect of these matters. You have no relevant prior convictions.
I read the victim impact statements of Stacey Leggate and that of Tim and Jane Palfreyman. Those victim impact statements clearly outline the seriousness of your offending and the impact of that offending on Ms Leggate and the owners Mr and Mrs Palfreyman.
The State submits that this is a very serious example of the crime of arson, given the degree of damage caused to the property and the shed. The estimated cost of damage was $417,402. It was put that fires cause considerable harm in the community, and obviously carry with them the risk of spreading and causing even further damage. Ther is inherently the risk to emergency service providers who responded to both of these incidents.
It was put that your moral culpability is high. It was you who directed your son, who was a minor at the time, to light the fire on not one, but two occasions. That was characterised as a breach of trust and an abuse of power in directing your son in that regard. Further, you showed a lack of remorse in the first instance because you did exactly the same thing after the first fire when you directed BAH to light the second fire. It was submitted that you had no regard for the consequences, not only for the victims, but for your own child, by placing him and the neighbouring properties in danger. Your offending was said to be aggravated by a degree of planning in arranging for BAH to light the fires.
The Court was provided with the pre-sentence report dated 31 March, by Ms Vollmer. At that point it was put on your behalf that you had been residing in Victoria and I was told that you were charged for this offending after fleeing family violence issues relating to your ex-partner and the father of some of your children, but that you then had returned to live with your mother in Tasmania.
Initially, you were assessed as unsuitable for the imposition of a home detention order. Your counsel submitted that was because at the time of the initial assessment you were living in Victoria. The Court sought a supplementary home detention assessment report. That created further delay in this sentencing process which is to be regretted. Ultimately the Court received a home detention addendum report. The addendum report dated 4 June 2026 found you unsuitable for home detention, community service and community based supervision.
Your counsel, in making sentencing submissions on your behalf, identified your children as BAH, 18, T, 14, X, 13, C, 8, and A, 10. Your counsel tendered a large number of documents relating to the disability of your son, T, who it was said has complex disabilities.
The State provided written submissions filed 16 July 2026 dealing with the points in mitigation based on T’s disabilities. It was accepted that T has “significant health issues that require a significant level of care”. T’s relevant diagnoses and nature of the care required by T, that are accepted by the State, included:
- T has been diagnosed with autism, ADHD and an intellectual disability and is under the care of a paediatrician;
- In a school environment, T requires substantial to extensive adjustments across multiple domains, including communication, self-care, interpersonal interactions and general tasks and demands;
- T is enrolled in the NDIS program which provides after school care. Removing T from his established routine would be detrimental to his health;
- T has symptoms and signs which are suggestive of epilepsy.
Your counsel submitted, on the basis of T’s disabilities, that “exceptional circumstances” exist which have a mitigatory effect in the Court’s sentencing disposition. That was contested by the State. In Oliver v Tasmania [2006] TASSC 95, Underwood CJ (Evans J agreeing) at [6] noted that in Tasmania the impact of imprisonment on a family member could only be taken into account in “exceptional circumstances”, and later at [11], only “in the most unusual case”. In Oliver the trial judge had no information regarding the offender beyond the ages of her three children, in that case were nine years, five years and three months.
In opposition the State relied upon R v Murphy [2005] NSWCCA 182 at [16]. In that case Buddin J (Barr and Hulme JJ agreeing) at [16] cited R v Grbin [2004] NSWCCA 220. In the latter case Dunford J (Levine and Howie JJ agreeing) stated the general rule in New South Wales which is (italics added), “that hardship to members of an offender’s family is generally irrelevant and can only be taken into account in highly exceptional circumstances and the care of young children is not normally an exceptional circumstance”.
Whilst there seems little practical difference between the formulation by Crawford CJ in Oliver at [11], “except in the most unusual case” and the New South Wales test of (italics added) “highly exceptional circumstances”, the use of the expression “exceptional circumstances” in Sullivan v R [1975] Tas SR (NC 1) cited by Crawford CJ at [6] in Oliver, rather than the New South Wales test which requires “highly exceptional circumstances”, suggests that the Tasmanian position has traditionally been more lenient than that in New South Wales.
Certainly, after Oliver, there are many examples in Tasmania of the application of the principle that hardship to the offender’s family or dependents as a result of a sentence is only relevant in exceptional cases, rather than the stricter requirement in New South Wales of “highly exceptional circumstances”. For example, Wilkie v Cohen [2016] TASSC 14 per Blow CJ at [13] applying Markovic v The Queen [2010] VSCA 105 and RDA v Tasmania [2021] TASCCA 4 per Porter AJ at [113]-[117] which also applied the test as explained in Markovic.
I have applied the test framed by Blow CJ and Porter AJ, that is, the requirement for “exceptional circumstances”. The hardship must be such that it goes beyond what is appropriate in securing the community’s welfare and protection through enforcement of the criminal law. In the absence of a finding of exceptional circumstances the factor of hardship to others is irrelevant: R v Nagul [2007] VSCA 8 per Chernov JA at [46].
This account of the test in Tasmania means that the New South Wales authorities, such as those relied upon by the State and referred to by Dunford J in R v Grbin, need to be treated with some caution. Indeed, Pearce J in Chilcott v de Witt [2022] TASSC 60 at [21] contrasts the Tasmanian position to that in New South Wales. Keeping that in mind, circumstances that were held to be highly exceptional in New South Wales in R v Maslen (1995) 79 A Crim R 199 where the child was grossly disabled (Duchennes muscular dystrophy, where the son confirmed to a wheelchair and unable to operate it himself, requiring significant physical assistance), and R v Bernarz [2000] NSWCCA 533 where the child was disabled (visual impairment, high care needs being reliant on others for his all activities of daily living or the supervision of the same, he is incapable of independent living and is extremely reliant on the presence of his mother).
In Chilcott v de Witt Pearce J at [15] described the offender, as:
“… aged 34, She lived with her son who was in year 5 at school and has autism and ADHD which give rise to difficult behavioural issues. He is funded by a funding package through the National Disability Insurance Scheme which provided some respite but never oversight. The demands imposed on the applicant to care for her son precluded her from employment. He attended school but she was often called upon to pick him up and take him to appointments or because his behaviour could not be controlled.”
His Honour at [22], adopted the approach of Livesey P in Adams v The Queen [2022] SASCA 47 and Blow CJ in Wilkies v Cohen, and noted that the issue has not been considered in detail by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Tasmania. Importantly, having described the nature of the applicant’s circumstances and framed the relevant test his Honour stated (italics added):
“For my part I would accept the potential impact on the applicant’s family, given her family circumstances and extent of her child’s disability, was serious and out of the ordinary … and would treat the potential hardship on the applicant’s child as relevant to sentence. However, consistently with the policy that hardship on others is part of the price to pay for serious crime, I would not regard it, in this case, as a factor of much weight“.
With respect, I would adopt that approach in respect of this head of mitigation. Having said that it should be noted that the common law approach to this issue in Victoria is currently being challenged in the High Court and argument was heard last week: Charisou v The King [2026] HCATrans 043 (12 August 2026).
These authorities place the Court in the unfortunate position of having to establish where on the spectrum the circumstances of an offender rest by reference to the disability suffered by a family member or members. T’s disabilities are similar to those discussed in Chilcott. Whilst I accept that the approach adopted by Pearce J in taking such disabilities into account, subject to weight, is correct; establishing the weight to be accorded such disabilities requires clear expert opinion as to how it is said a custodial disposition would affect T. Equally, such an exercise may still have only limited impact on the sentence to be imposed in circumstances such as this where the offending is particularly serious.
I have no information before me regarding the prevalence of diagnoses of autism, ADHD and an intellectual disability and how “unusual” are T’s circumstances, either separately or in aggregate, or a detailed account of how this sentencing disposition may specifically impact upon T. There are other prospective health risks referred to in the material tendered by counsel that are unidentified in their seriousness or impact. Here I am referring to the submissions regarding heart and neurological issues that have been identified clinically and the requirement for T to have MRIs on his brain.
The Court was provided on your behalf with:
- 2026 semester one report for T from the East Gippsland Specialist School, from the Principal, Daniel Clark;
- report from Bowen Road Primary School for T dated 26 February 2021;
- appointment notification from the Royal Hobart Hospital dated 15 June 2026;
- report from Capstone Medical Centre, Eastwood dated 4 July 2025;
- school psychologist report from Bowen Road Primary School dated 16 March 2017, and
- a bundle of consultation outpatient summaries from Royal Hobart Hospital;
- report from the support coordinator at the East Gippsland Specialist School dated 2 June 2026;
- letter from Acting Principal of the East Gippsland Specialist School, and
- NDIS review report;
I am prepared to accept that the circumstances outlined in this regard have a limited mitigatory effect. However, the evidential burden of establishing the weight such matters have in the sentencing calculus must fall on the offender.
Whilst I have been provided with significant amounts of material it is more a collection of reports than a thematic account of why it is said different sentencing dispositions would impact on T’s health or care. When I asked for a summary of how it was said this material came together, I was told such an account was not available. It is not for the Court to fossick through large amounts of material to see what can be gleaned in aid of submissions of “exceptional circumstances”.
In New South Wales, where courts have found that the particular circumstances of an offender constituted “highly exceptional” circumstances because of a disabled child, and the difficulties arising therefrom, it has been found that justifies a reduction of the non-parole period: R v Bednarz [2000] NSWCCA 533.
Whilst it may readily be accepted that you have your hands full with the number of children in your care and the complications moving from T’s disabilities I am unable to conclude that mitigation on this basis rises beyond what Pearce J found in Chilcott, that is that they are relevant but have limited weight.
It was also put by your counsel that Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37, 249 CLR 571 provides a basis of mitigation. In that context counsel relied upon your lack of education, adolescent experiences, pregnancies from an early age, and suffering considerable family violence in multiple relationships over many years. I will certainly take those matters into account in mitigation, and they provide some specific explanation as to why you formed a relationship with Mr Woolley which enabled him to urge and direct you in the course of your offending.
In the home detention assessment report dated 31 March 2026 it was reported that you were born and raised in Tasmania and are one of six siblings, you had no contact with your biological father.
You were born a twin but your twin sibling did not survive birth. Your mother served a custodial term. During your mother’s incarceration you lived with a maternal aunt and experienced significant family violence.
Your mother remains supportive, as does your sister. You have five children aged between eight and 18 years of age, three of which remain in your care. You are the full time-carer for T.
In general mitigation it was put that at the time of sentencing submissions you were 34 years of age, and you have been parenting your children through a number of difficult times, with two partners who have faced family violence charges and other matters in relation to you. That was confirmed in the home assessment report which reported 23 documented family violence related incidents from your two previous relationships.
It is noted that you completed grade 10 at Ogilvie High School and were pregnant with your first child at 15.
It is hard to deal with undiagnosed or untreated conditions in mitigation, but I note you report untreated heart complications exacerbated by anxiety, you are a diabetic and have been prescribed GLP-1 medications to support weight management.
You suffer from historical mental health challenges, including suicidal ideation and engagement in non-suicidal self-injury. You also reported having Complex Post Traumatic Stress Disorder as well as low self-esteem, anxiety and Avoidance/Restrictive Food Intake Disorder. The Court does not have detailed medical reports regarding your health. Indeed the Court has more information regarding T’s health than yours.
You have not been formally employed, that reflects your lack of education, your early pregnancies and the reported issues with family violence.
It was noted that you have had matters in the Family Court as well in relation to the children, and that you have had sole care of, at least, three of those children.
It was submitted that the prospect of a relationship with Mr Woolley was seen by you as the prospect of some light at the end of the tunnel. It was submitted you were heavily influenced in your decision-making in the belief that there may be a relationship with the co‑accused. That decision-making, it is said, did not involve any use of drugs and alcohol.
It appears to have given Mr Woolley significant influence over you and driven your preparedness to participate in this offending. Your engagement with Mr Woolley turned into arsons and a joint criminal enterprise by you both. I am told you accept that you are responsible by your instigation of these offences, and that your criminal responsibility is clear. I accept that you were prepared to do anything to sustain Mr Woolley’s interest in you as an intimate partner, and to some extent you became Mr Woolley’s dupe and susceptible to his urging and direction. This, perhaps, reflects the experiences you have had in the context of earlier relationships characterised by family violence. Albeit, it cannot be said that you were so overborn by Mr Woolley that you were not responsible for your actions, which have an independent flavour as it relates to the mechanism by which the fires were set. The repeated setting of fires is a matter that impacts directly on this sentencing disposition.
You have ultimately pleaded guilty. It was not at the earliest opportunity but such a plea has utilitarian value. Whilst it took some time for you to plead to this matter you initially cooperated with police and admitted your role when interviewed.
You are remorseful and regretful. I am told that you have struggled for years with your children, and that your offending has been the greatest regret of your life.
You regret that you involved your son, and that you are now at jeopardy of losing the care of your children as a result of her own actions.
Nicole Lyn Humes you have been convicted, upon your plea of guilty, to two counts of arson contrary to s 268 of the Criminal Code 1924. They were extremely serious offences. Your plea was not an early one but I take it into account. You engaged in joint criminal conduct at the bidding of Mr Woolley your co-accused and you instigated the setting of two fires by your son, BAH. Those fires impacted the lives of Ms Leggate and Mr and Mrs Palfreyman who have given victim impact statements in this matter, and you put your son at risk.
There is a strong need to impose a sentence which reflects the need to punish you for your offending, denounce your conduct and deter both you and others from offending of this nature.
Your criminal culpability is significant. Had you not instructed your son to set the fires it is unclear whether this offending would have occurred. You engaged in a joint criminal enterprise with Mr Woolley. Its express object was to harm Ms Leggate. Of course it also had other victims in Mr and Mrs Palfreyman, and created a risk for others including neighbours, first responders and your son.
You had a mistaken belief that your conduct would lead to a continuing relationship with Mr Woolley, or would buttress such a relationship. That motivation whilst clear is very hard to comprehend on a lot of different levels, especially as it led to you involving your son. However, I consider your culpability, whilst significant, not to be as great as that of Mr Woolley, whose animus towards Ms Leggate appears to be the motivating force behind these crimes. I note his constant urging as a catalyst for your offending. You must, however, be sentenced in a manner that reflects your role in these offences.
I impose one sentence, I sentence you to three years and six months imprisonment to be served immediately, but I make you eligible for parole after 15 months. Your parole eligibility rests on the matters put in mitigation, including T’s circumstances but especially those arising under Bugmy v The Queen. Absent those factors I would only have made you eligible for parole after serving half your sentence.
I make a compensation order pursuant to s 68(1) of the Sentencing Act 1997, in favour of the complainants, and Ms Leggate, in an amount to be assessed.