STATE OF TASMANIA v GEORGIA JANE BOWKER DUNN 10 DECEMBER 2025
COMMENTS ON PASSING SENTENCE SHANAHAN CJ
Ms Bowker-Dunn you have been convicted by a jury of your peers on one count of causing grievous bodily harm by negligent driving, contrary to s 167B of the Criminal Code 1924 (“Criminal Code”) and a second count of dangerous driving, contrary to s 172A of the Criminal Code. In respect of the first count, whilst you were charged with causing grievous bodily harm by dangerous driving, the jury convicted you on the alternative count of causing grievous bodily harm by negligent driving.
There is also an application before me pursuant to s 385A of the Criminal Code in relation to complaint 1685/2022. That complaint contains one charge of driving a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicating liquor pursuant to s4(a) of the Road Safety (Alcohol and Drugs) Act; one count of a driver involved in an accident failing to stop, pursuant to s 33(2) of the Traffic Act, and a further count of driving a motor vehicle while exceeding the prescribed alcohol limit pursuant to s 61 of the Road Safety (Alcohol and Drugs) Act. I will deal with these charges as part of the sentence in this matter.
You were dating Mr Roberts at the time of your offending. On the material day you had been out together. After spending time together during that evening, which included consuming alcohol, you ultimately fell into an argument. You returned to your parked car in Warwick Street. The Court saw the relevant CCTV. Mr Roberts approached the car. You then drove off. It was your initial driving that is the subject of count 1, which ended when Mr Roberts, who had been clinging to the roof rack of your car, fell to the ground on Church Street after you had turned the corner from Warwick Road into Church Street. The driving the subject of count 2 followed immediately thereafter when you proceeded down Church Street before hitting a stone wall across the intersection with Patrick Street. You then continued driving with damage to the front of your car, driving on the wrong side of the street during parts of your journey until you reached the intersection with Elizabeth Street and your car would no longer function.
Turning to count 1, your negligent driving, which caused grievous bodily harm, was very serious because it was committed whilst under the influence of alcohol, in a significantly built up area, involved excessive speed, and resulted in significant, and life threatening, injuries to Christopher Michael Roberts. Your continued offending immediately thereafter on the second count, that of dangerous driving, by failing to stop and continuing to drive, put other lives at danger, involved a collision with a stone wall, driving your car whilst damaged, driving on the incorrect side of the road and continuing to drive until your car would no longer function. Your driving did not cease because you chose to stop.
During the trial you relied on the defence of necessity based on a forensic psychiatric assessment, but the jury rejected that defence and your contention that your mental condition was such that you had a flight response that explained your driving. The jury was given a specific direction that you could only be found guilty on count 1 if your driving was voluntary and intentional. The jury’s verdict establishes that fact. It is important to be aware that I am obliged to sentence you on the basis of the jury’s verdict.
Your offending, perhaps not unsurprisingly, has had very serious consequences. Listening to the evidence at trial it painted a picture of your reluctance to accept responsibility for your driving or its impacts, and that is also reflected in the Home Detention Assessment Report that the Court obtained. I have now heard submissions on sentence. Your counsel has made submissions regarding your acceptance of responsibility and remorse. I have, of course, taken those submissions into account.
In respect of count 1, given the contested issues at trial it is implicit in the jury’s verdict that your negligent driving included failing to exercise due care and attention. Certainly, you had the ordinary obligation of every driver to establish who was in the vicinity of the vehicle before driving off. That includes identifying whether someone might be at risk if a vehicle is driven away. I say that because there was evidence led at trial as to the visibility of Mr Roberts and the likelihood you would be aware of his presence.
I accept, and find, that had you exercised the required level of caution you would have seen Mr Roberts next to your vehicle prior to starting your car, and one hopes you would not have driven the vehicle in the manner in which you did, or at all. Equally, it is hard to imagine how a driver could not see someone clinging to the roof rack of his or her car whilst it was in motion. If nothing else, one would imagine that there would be sounds associated with such a person moving against the side of the car. However, I am not prepared to find that you were aware of Mr Roberts clinging to your car during the period of driving which is relevant to count 1 because of the jury’s verdict that you drove negligently rather than dangerously.
The speed and the manner in which you took off and then manoeuvred your vehicle was obviously negligent and the outcome, in terms of the injuries to Mr Roberts, was tragic. Your negligent driving was for a relatively short period but it was followed immediately thereafter by a longer period of dangerous driving (count 2) which only ceased when your car would not function. Your negligent driving has to be seen and understood in that context.
In respect of count 1, the State directed my attention to the decision of Geason J in Richardson v Barnes [2018] TASSC 46, a case concerning negligent driving causing grievous bodily harm. It was put that the starting point in sentencing for such an offence is:
“A consideration of the facts … to assess the extent to which the applicant’s driving has departed from the standard of care of a reasonable and prudent driver”.
An assessment of the facts is required because there is such a wide range of circumstances that may be caught by a charge of negligent driving causing grievous bodily harm, and I need to consider where your offending sits in that context. In Richardson v Barnes the negligent driving was said to involve “18 seconds of inattention”, see [32]. However, the negligent driving in your case was far more serious than that.
The consequences of a departure from the standard of care of a reasonable and prudent driver can be serious and life changing, as it has proved in this case. The particulars of the relevant negligent driving demonstrate that it included, (a) driving under the influence of alcohol; (b) accelerating your vehicle whilst a person was holding on to the roof bar; and (c) driving at excessive speed. It was put by the State, and I accept, that your degree of negligence extended well beyond a momentary lapse in judgment.
You were in your vehicle for a period before driving away. You had time to consider your course of conduct before acting. Your negligence included the fact that you were driving with a high concentration of alcohol in your blood, to the point where you were incapable of having proper control of the vehicle, at the time that you were driving. No doubt the effect of alcohol also impaired your judgment and your ability to assess risk.
I accept and find that your initial driving was a serious example of negligent driving causing grievous bodily harm and that the consequences for Mr Roberts have been life changing. The injuries suffered by Mr Roberts put your negligent driving in the most serious category.
The penalty for causing grievous bodily harm by dangerous driving requires attention to s 334B of the Criminal Code. If the jury are not satisfied that you are guilty of dangerous driving they can convict of an offence under s 32(1) or s 32(2B) of the Traffic Act 1925. In this case the jury found you guilty of causing grievous bodily harm by negligent driving, which is an offence under s 32(2B) which provides the penalty for a first offence:
“(2B) A person must not cause grievous bodily harm to another person by driving a motor vehicle on a public street negligently.
Penalty: In the case of –
a first offence, a fine not exceeding 10 penalty units and imprisonment for a term not exceeding 1 year …”.
The provision then deals with the penalty for subsequent offences, but not this case.
Turning to the second count, being one count of dangerous driving contrary to s 172A of the Criminal Code. I accept, consistent with the jury’s verdict, that you drove: (a) under the influence of alcohol, (b) whilst pedestrians were in close proximity to your vehicle, (c) such that you lost control of your vehicle and collided with the stone wall; (d) you drove with front-end damage to the headlight on the front passenger side, and (e) you drove on the incorrect side of the road. The evidence at trial was that there was a trail of fluid which came from your car, and showed the route you took in your car at the material time. I will sentence you on that basis.
During the sentencing hearing I read the Victim Impact Statement of Christopher Michael Roberts, the complainant on the first count.
Mr Roberts suffered a traumatic head injury with multiple fractures to the skull, with a subsequent brain injury and nerve damage to his legs as a result of your driving at the material time. He has been left with neurological damage affecting his mobility. The results of your driving, for him, have been catastrophic.
Mr Roberts spent weeks in an induced coma, intubated and ventilated and he required brain surgery. Dr Slatyer gave evidence at trial that had he not received the medical intervention that he did, Mr Roberts would have died. For several weeks it was not known whether he would live or die given the seriousness of the injuries that he suffered. No doubt there may be cases where negligent driving causing grievous bodily harm has resulted in more severe injuries but, in terms of the damage caused, your case is in the most serious category.
Mr Roberts spent six months in rehabilitation, first in Royal Hobart Hospital and then in the Peacock Centre. When released, he lived with his mother and had his driving licence suspended as he could not operate a vehicle because of the brain injury that he had suffered. He also had difficulty hearing and struggled with mental processing. I heard evidence of Mr Roberts’ post traumatic amnesia, and the impact on Mr Roberts’ of his issues with memory and how his disabilities continue to affect him. Mr Roberts is now able to drive again.
Mr Roberts lost his independence in the aftermath of this incident. It is an incident not an accident. He continues to suffer impacts to his physical health, and has difficulty with his balance and walking naturally.
Prior to your driving, Mr Roberts was a strong and fit 48 year old, but his capacity to pursue previous hobbies and pastimes has since been limited. This incident has impacted his relationship with his daughter and his mental health. Mr Roberts gave his evidence from a wheelchair and required the use of the wheelchair to access the protected witness room.
You have no time spent in custody.
The State’s submissions raised the question whether, in respect of the first count, are you to be sentenced for the outcome of your negligent driving or the nature of that driving?
The report of the Sentencing Advisory Council, “Sentencing of Driving Offences that Result in Death or Injury“, released in April 2017, compared the sentencing task in respect of an offence contrary to s 167B of the Criminal Code to an offence contrary to s 172A of the Criminal Code. The Sentencing Advisory Council said:
“An offender convicted of dangerous driving has the same level of fault as an offender convicted of dangerous driving causing death or grievous bodily harm; however, the harm caused is different. In the case of dangerous driving, it is the risk of harm that is punished, whereas it is the realisation of that harm that is punished where death or serious injury results from an offender’s dangerous driving.”
(see also Porter AJ in Banks v Tasmania [2019] TASSCA 1 at [28], Brett and Geason JJ agreeing).
Similarly, in respect of count 1, it is the result of your negligent driving that is to be punished albeit in the context of the nature of your driving.
Whilst the risk of harm and the realisation of harm are linked, they can be separately identified and evaluated. I need to sentence you in respect of your negligent driving on count 1 for the realised harm – being the outcome of your negligent driving. Thus, even whilst this is a first offence, your offending is in the most serious category of grievous bodily harm. It is hard to imagine injuries that you could have inflicted on Mr Roberts, short of death, that could have been more serious.
As to aggravating features in relation to the first count, the State submitted they included your failure to stop or to provide assistance to Mr Roberts. You continued to drive. I note the manner of your driving is a component of your offending and included the speed at which you were driving, your turn into Church Street and Ms Palacios’ evidence that she heard your car accelerating.
In respect of the second count, Porter AJ in Banks v Tasmania at [44] identified a number of factors relevant to sentence in matters of dangerous driving. They include:
“The extent and nature of any injuries inflicted. The number of people put at risk. The degree of speed. The degree of intoxication or of substance abuse. The erratic driving. The length of the journey, which exposed others to risk. The ignoring of warnings.”
The State submitted, and I accept, that your offending on count 2 was at the high end of dangerous driving and a serious example of the crime. Further, it was put that general deterrence is the primary consideration here despite your limited prior convictions because of the need to protect the public.
It was submitted that it was an aggravating factor that you continued to drive until your car could not function because relevant lubricants and other liquids had drained from you car due to the damage incurred as a result of your driving. Essentially, the submission is that you failed to stop and would have kept driving but the car would not function.
Also, an aggravating feature of the dangerous driving on count 2 was your passage close to other road users (Mr Juan and Ms Palacios) and then hitting a stone wall but continuing to drive. Certainly, that provides some suggestion of how inebriated you were and the impact of the alcohol in your system on your driving. You were driving in a residential area and then drove into the North Hobart strip in the early hours of a Saturday morning, where one might expect pedestrians to be walking along the street. Your driving was erratic and you drove without a headlight.
It was also submitted that your offending was aggravated because it occurred in the context of family violence. Up until this point, you were in a relationship with Mr Roberts.
I understand that it is your offending that ended that relationship. I am asked by the State to record this as a family violence offence under s 13A of the Family Violence Act 2004. Despite dating Mr Roberts at the material time, I am not persuaded that the relationship between you was such that it satisfies the test at s 4 of the Relationships Act 2003, and hence it is not caught by the definition of “family relationship” at s 4 of the Family Violence Act 2004. Therefore, you do not fall within the definition of “spouse or partner” in relation to Mr Roberts for the purposes of that Act, and thus your offending is not “family violence” as defined at s 7.
It was noted by the State that you do not have the benefit of a plea of guilty, but that is simply a recognition that the matter was the subject of a trial and the jury’s conviction on both counts.
I was provided with a Home Detention Assessment Report based on interviews with you and your father amongst other material. Presentence reports are not an opportunity for an offender to make comments or submissions in respect of sentencing dispositions. I found your apparent willingness to comment on sentencing dispositions revealing (at un-numbered page 5), when you said:
“In relation to sentencing, Ms Bowker Dunn reported experiencing significant trauma over the past three and a half years as a result of the incident and the ongoing court proceedings. She expressed the view that a home detention order would be excessive and instead hoped for a suspended sentence. Additionally, she felt that the potential loss of her driver’s licence would be unwarranted given her otherwise clean record and noted that such a loss would negatively impact her ability to care for her children and attend medical appointments. During the reading of her report on 23 September 2025, Ms Bowker Dunn expressed deep sadness and remorse regarding her offending.”
The report noted (in the middle of the same page):
“Ms Bowker Dunn identified both herself and the victim as affected parties in the incident, acknowledging that they were both fortunate not to have sustained fatal injuries. She did not identify any other individuals as being directly impacted by her actions.”
I found your willingness to identify yourself as a victim of your own offending entirely inappropriate and lacking in any appreciation of who was responsible for your offending. You are, according to the jury’s verdict, not the victim, you are the offender.
The report also included the following passage (italics added):
“Ms Bowker-Dunn admitted shared responsibility with the victim for the offences of driving a vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor, being a driver involved in an accident and failing to stop and driving a motor vehicle while exceeding the prescribed alcohol limit. She provided personal justification for her actions, citing violent behaviour from the victim which triggered a dissociative episode and a flight response from what she perceived as a dangerous situation. Ms Bowker Dunn further explained that she had attempted to obtain alternate transport, specifically an Uber/taxi prior to the incident but was unsuccessful.”
Whatever trauma you have experienced since as a result of this incident, is due to your own actions and it is dwarfed by the impacts on Mr Robert’s life. Your observations to the authors of the presentence report regarding sentence show a lack of insight and an unwillingness to accept the seriousness of the harm caused by your driving. Those observations are inconsistent with the jury’s verdict which rejected your defence of necessity based on the matters that you raised with Community Corrections.
Your reluctance to accept anything but shared responsibility for your own actions is not consistent with the deep sadness and remorse you expressed regarding the outcome of your offending. I found these passages in the presentence report confused, conflicting and unhelpful.
In mitigation I was taken to the reports of Dr Michael Evenhuis, consultant psychiatrist, dated 10 September and 15 December 2022 which I received as exhibits on sentence, and which were also adduced in evidence at trial in support of the defence of necessity. As I have noted, that defence was rejected by the jury. That means that the use of these reports in the sentencing process has to be approached with some care.
In respect of Dr Evenhuis’ report of 10 September 2022, I was only taken to paragraphs [160]-[169]. In relation to the Dr Evenhuis’ report of 15 December 2022, I was taken to Dr Evenhuis’ response to question 3, which appears on page 7 of that report.
I was provided with a character reference from Mr Cleve Shook. I accept your offending is out of character, but that is not unusual in this type of offending,
It was put that at the time of the sentencing hearing you were 49 years of age and 45 years old at the date of the offending on 22 January 2022. You have no prior convictions, and you have not offended over the period since this offending occurred. It is disappointing that the matter has taken more than three and a half years to reach a final conclusion.
You have held an Australian driver’s licence for the entirety of your adult life, as well as since the offending. You reside in Blackmans Bay. You live on your own. You have two children aged 12 and 14 from a past relationship, who you ordinarily have custody of 50 per cent of the time.
You were in a long term relationship from age 19 until age 40.
I was told due to the ongoing impact of the extended course of court proceedings on your mental health, your children are currently living with their father for the majority of the time. I am told your children are your primary motivation in life, and that you recognise you cannot currently provide them with the support and stability they need. You hope that following the conclusion of these proceedings, your mental health will improve, and you will be able to facilitate moving back to regular custody arrangements.
Your employment began at age 14 and you have been employed throughout your life in a wide range of roles, including acting as a sales support person for a real estate agency, which you ceased due to what is reported as the trauma associated with these court proceedings You have also worked as a professional ceramicist, opera singer, stylist, and art and music teacher.
You are currently in receipt of JobSeeker payments. You are experiencing financial hardship in meeting your mortgage repayment obligations for which you are solely responsible. A fine is not an available sentencing option.
I received some submissions as to the hardship you may experience if you were to lose your motor vehicle driver’s licence, albeit it was accepted that a period of disqualification will be imposed.
Turning to the two reports of Dr Evenhuis. It was submitted that Dr Evenhuis has diagnosed you with complex post-traumatic stress disorder with cluster B personality traits. Dr Evenhuis relates this diagnosis to your upbringing and the abuse that you received primarily at the hands of your mother.
Dr Evenhuis ultimately provides the opinion that this condition contributed to the commission of the offending, due to a heightened sense of threat and perceived need to flee from Mr Roberts.
Reliance was, and is, placed on paragraphs [160]-[169] of Dr Evenhuis’ report of 10 September 2022. The causal link between your mental condition and your driving was a matter that was necessarily explored by the jury in the context of the defence run at trial and it was rejected, as established by your conviction. The jury did not accept that your mental condition compelled, or resulted in, your offending.
Nevertheless, it was submitted that I can still take into account Dr Evenhuis’ opinion that if it were not for your anxiety state, you would not have attempted to drive your motor vehicle. In my view that submission fails because it was precisely that link that was relied upon to support the defence of necessity and which was rejected by the jury.
However, it was put that your condition and anxiety state impaired your ability to exercise appropriate judgment, and thus engaged the Verdins principles. That is a reference to the six principle referred to in R v Verdins, Buckley and Vo [2007] VSCA 102, 16 VR 269 (“Verdins”) at 276, [32].
The first principle is put in the following terms, where impaired mental functioning, whether temporary or permanent, could reduce the moral culpability of the offending conduct as distinct from the offender’s legal responsibility, the condition affects the punishment that is just in all the circumstances, and denunciation is less likely to be a relevant sentencing objective.
Thus, I am placed in the position of having to ascertain what operation that principle may have in circumstances where the jury have rejected the causal link between your mental condition and your offending, but it is submitted that you have reduced moral culpability because of Dr Evenhuis’ diagnosis. Of course that submission does not deal with the impact or disinhibiting effect of being highly intoxicated, your blood alcohol level was almost four times higher than the legal limit for driving.
I note Dr Evenhuis’ evidence-in-chief at trial regarding the impact of alcohol on your decision making at the time (see transcript 25 July 2025 at 245-246). I found his evidence unhelpful and it did not help to clarify how he understood your inebriation to affect your decision making at the material time. Whilst I am prepared to take into account Dr Evenhuis’ diagnosis for the purposes of sentencing at some general level, it is difficult to apportion any precise degree to which your moral culpability is reduced.
It was also put that an actual term of imprisonment could have significant adverse effects on your mental health, due to your underlying mental condition. That submission sought to engage the fifth Verdins principle to the effect that impaired mental functioning, whether temporary or permanent, may impact on sentence where the existence of the condition at the date of sentencing (or its foreseeable recurrence) could mean that a given sentence would weigh more heavily on the offender than it would on a person of normal health.
I found the suggestion by Dr Evenhuis at [169] of his report dated 10 September 2022, to the effect that the fifth principle was engaged because your “life experiences would likely differ from the majority of other inmates” to be irrelevant and to misunderstand the operation of that principle and the parameters of sentencing. Similarly, any sense of shame as referred to by Dr Evenhuis is a matter that is not linked to his diagnosis.
However, I accept the submission that you would struggle with incarceration because of your mental condition as diagnosed by Dr Evenhuis. Such a conclusion does not preclude a period of immediate imprisonment but may impact on the length of any such term.
I then heard submissions on your behalf as to totality and proportionality. Of course ,those principles are applied in the context of the nature of the offending and any points in aggravation or mitigation.
I was encouraged to give more weight to the short distance, or the actual distance that you drove on count 1. However, you only stopped driving when the car would go no further at a time when your offending for both counts was complete. You did not stop when Mr Roberts fell from the car, you did not stop when you hit a stone wall, you wanted to keep driving even when the car would go no further. In the latter instance, Mr Roberts was not in the vicinity. That suggests to me that alcohol played a significant part in your decision making at the material time. I have already referred to the risks to the public associated with each of these counts.
It was submitted that although the driving occurred in the Hobart CBD, that due to the distance driven, there were not a great number of other pedestrians or other drivers put at risk, and that this can be distinguished from more egregious extended courses of dangerous driving, that are done at significant speed that would put many more members of the public at risk of harm.
I accept that had the driving been of longer duration more people would have been at risk, that much is logical, but I do not accept that the length of your driving is a point in mitigation. You drove without reference to those about you. Ultimately, in respect of the second count, you kept going despite hitting a stone wall and having a damaged vehicle, you would have kept driving had the car remained functioning. Those matters stand out in the sentencing calculus that I am to apply.
It was submitted that count 1 and count 3 on the summary complaint, 1685/2022 that the charge of drive under the influence and the exceed .05 charge should be subsumed and dismissed on sentencing for the dangerous driving charge at count 2 of the indictment. I was provided with a copy of Green CJ’s decision in Wood v Major (1992) 3 Tas R 249 (16 July 1992) said to support that approach, and that if I followed that approach, I would not be bound by the mandatory penalty provisions under s 17 of the Road Safety (Alcohol and Drugs) Act, and my discretion to disqualify would then stem from s 55(2) of the Sentencing Act 1997; see also De Simoni (1981) 147 CLR 383.
It was also submitted that the offence of negligent driving causing death, generally, does not attract actual terms of imprisonment in this jurisdiction. Obviously, offending of the more serious sort, such as this, is more likely to draw a custodial sentence and the appropriate sentence will reflect the outcome, quality and nature of the relevant driving.
It was put that a global suspended sentence of imprisonment and lengthy period of disqualification is appropriate. That submission ignores the seriousness of the outcome of your driving in respect of count 1 and the substantial risks you created by your dangerous driving at count 2. The suggested disposition does not meet your objective criminality.
You have been assessed as suitable for a home detention order, which you have indicated a willingness to accept despite your observations to Community Corrections that you considered such a disposition to be “excessive”. You have been assessed as unsuitable for community service as a result of your mental and physical health risks. You have also been assessed as unsuitable for a community supervision order.
Your counsel submitted that you hold concerns as to whether your post‑traumatic stress disorder would cope with the need to complete Community Corrections orders alongside pro‑criminal associates. It is inevitable that those completing such orders, or who are incarcerated on terms of immediate imprisonment, will do so amongst others who have similarly been sentenced as a result of the criminal justice system.
Georgia Jane Bowker Dunn I convict you of the two counts on the indictment.
On complaint 1685/2022, I am prepared to deal with counts 1 and 3 on the basis that they be subsumed on sentencing for the dangerous driving charge at count 2 of the indictment and otherwise dismissed. I convict you on count 2 on that complaint being one count of a driver involved in an accident failing to stop, pursuant to s 33(2) of the Traffic Act.
You have no time accrued in custody.
I have formed the view that a home detention order of the type deemed suitable by Community Corrections would not meet the seriousness of your offending.
In respect of these matters, I impose one sentence. I sentence you to an immediate term of imprisonment of 18 months, that period of imprisonment reflects the seriousness of your offending but has been substantially reduced to take into account your mental health and the other matters in mitigation to which I have referred.
The question then arises whether any portion of the term of imprisonment that I have imposed should be suspended. I have also taken the matters raised in respect of your mental health and mitigation into account in that regard. That question has required some very careful consideration. Your attitude to your offending has, as I have noted, been “shot through” with an unwillingness to accept responsibility. Your observations as to appropriate sentences in the course of the interview for the presentence report have been inappropriate and unhelpful.
In the end, I have put those matters to one side, and will suspend 12 months of the term of imprisonment for a period of 12 months on the condition that you do not commit an offence punishable by imprisonment. That means you will serve the balance of the immediate term of imprisonment, being six months.
Also in that regard, under s 24(2) of the Sentencing Act 1997 I make the order suspending 12 months of your sentence subject to the following conditions:
That you will be subject to the supervision of a probation officer for a period of 12 months after your release, and I impose the following conditions:
- You must, during the operational period of the order, submit to the supervision of a probation officer as required by the probation officer;
- You must, during the operational period of the order, undergo assessment and treatment for alcohol dependency as directed by a probation officer;
- You must not, during the operational period of the order, consume alcohol;
- You must, during the operational period of the order, submit to medical, psychological or psychiatric assessment or treatment as directed by a probation officer;
- That you undertake any rehabilitation program required by your probation officer; and
- You must, for the purposes of these orders, report to a probation officer at 75 Liverpool Street, Hobart, within two business days of your release.
Pursuant to s 55(2) of the Sentencing Act 1997 I suspend you motor vehicle drivers licence for a period of two years from today’s date.