STATE OF TASMANIA v TAITE IAN ELI WEBSTER ESTCOURT J
COMMENTS ON PASSING SENTENCE 6 SEPTEMBER 2019
The defendant, Taite Ian Eli Webster, has pleaded guilty to one count of dangerous driving on indictment and to charges on complaint of evading police in aggravated circumstances, driving while not the holder of a driver’s licence, using an unregistered and uninsured motor vehicle and failing to comply with a requirement for a blood (oral fluid test).
Around 5:00 pm on 20 November 2018, Constables Whitelaw and Callahan were on duty when they made a determination to follow an unregistered red Holden Barina driven by the defendant, travelling towards the intersection of Bass and Edgeworth Streets in Warrane. A front seat passenger could also been seen in the vehicle. The defendant did not hold a driver’s licence.
Constable Whitelaw activated lights and sirens and upon seeing the police vehicle, the defendant drove through the intersection of Bass and Edgeworth Streets at excessive speed thus committing the offence of evading police.
After driving through the intersection, the defendant drove along Bass Street until Zeehan Street. The defendant lost control of the vehicle as it turned into Zeehan Street, crossing over both sides of the road, and the speed was observed to be hazardous for all road users.
Police continued to display emergency lights and sirens, and continued to follow and observe the vehicle. The vehicle then turned into Heemskirk Street before travelling towards and onto Cumberland Street. When entering Cumberland Street the defendant did not give way to traffic. The vehicle was then observed travelling back onto Bass Street at a speed of approximately 80 km/h.
Police then observed the vehicle turn left onto Edgeworth Street where, again, it failed to give way to traffic. This area is surrounded by a number of shops and is a high pedestrian area. At the time, five to ten pedestrians were present in the area. The defendant drove in a manner that failed to heed the number of pedestrians that were present, putting them and other road users at risk.
The vehicle travelled at excessive speed down Edgeworth Street, through a roundabout intersection, failing to stop and check or to slow down or give way to any traffic at the intersection. Other vehicles were observed in the area at that time.
The vehicle then travelled onto Schouten Street at excessive speed, with police gauging the speed to be 87 km/h.
The vehicle failed to stop at the end of Schouten Street and turned into Dampier Street, again failing to give way to oncoming traffic. As the vehicle continued along Dampier Street, the defendant lost control of the vehicle while turning onto Flagstaff Gully Road. The vehicle crossed to the wrong side of the road and continued at excessive speed towards the dead end of Flagstaff Gully Road. Again, no attempt was made by the defendant to stop the vehicle, despite police lights and sirens being clearly activated.
As the vehicle reached the end of Flagstaff Gully Road, the defendant and his passenger decamped whilst the vehicle was still moving. The defendant and his passenger were arrested shortly afterwards. The two had separated and the defendant was located hiding in bushland behind the Edgeworth Street soccer grounds.
The defendant was arrested and taken to Bellerive Police Station where an oral fluid test was conducted that returned a positive reading. He refused to submit to a blood test.
The defendant was born on 5 August 1998, thus at 20 years old is still a young offender. His only relevant prior conviction was for driving under the influence, and unlicensed on 17 June 2017.
He made admissions to police and he pleaded guilty at a very early stage, indeed the earliest practical opportunity. He is entitled to credit for having done so.
Apart from that, while the defendant had a difficult upbringing and suffers from a number of personal and emotional problems, there are really no significant mitigating factors in this case.
Turning to sentence, in Banks v Tasmania [2019] TASSCA 1, Porter J examined the, then, 15 sentences that had been passed by this Court since dangerous driving was made an indictable offence in 2017. His Honour noted two sentences only were passed for single counts of dangerous driving and no other offending, one of 12 months’ imprisonment cumulative to an existing sentence – high speed and erratic driving over a relatively short distance and one of 22 months’ imprisonment where there were relevant prior convictions, a serious example of dangerous driving and relevant prior convictions with a number of related summary offences dealt with in the lower court.
Of the remaining 13 sentences, the most lenient one was one of eight months’ imprisonment, with two months’ imprisonment cumulative for evading police, the total term being suspended on conditions. The offender had no prior convictions
At the other end of the range, his Honour noted that in respect of an offender with a relevant offending history, there was a sentence of two years and six months’ imprisonment for dangerous driving, driving whilst disqualified and refuse breath analysis, with three months cumulative for evading police. Since then the Court of Criminal Appeal has looked further at sentences for dangerous driving.
The defendant is convicted of each of the offences to which he has pleaded guilty. Having regard to all of the circumstances and in particular the defendant’s youth, his relevant, but limited, prior convictions and his early plea of guilty I impose a single sentence in respect of all offences except the aggravated evading police of 12 months’ imprisonment, wholly suspended for a period of 3 years on condition that he commit no offence punishable by imprisonment during that period.
In respect of the offence of evading police the defendant is sentenced to 3 months’ imprisonment to be served concurrently with the 12 months sentence just imposed, and again wholly suspended on the same terms and conditions as that period. I make a Community Corrections Order and in addition to the statutory core conditions I make special conditions that the defendant must, during the operational period of the order which is 18 months, attend educational and other programs as directed by the Court or a probation officer, and secondly that the defendant must, during the operational period of the order, submit to a medical, psychological or psychiatric assessment or treatment as directed by a probation officer.
The defendant has been disqualified from driving since 20 November 2018, and would have remained so until 20 November 2020 by virtue of the police disqualification notice. That is a sufficient period of disqualification in my view. Crushing periods of disqualification of young persons from driving can, in my experience, be counterproductive. The defendant is disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence until 20 November 2020 upon the police disqualification notice lapsing as it does today.
The Crown makes application pursuant to s 27(4)(a) of the Sentencing Act 1997 to breach the following suspended sentences:
- wholly suspended sentence of 2 months’ imprisonment, imposed on 26 June 2018 in the Hobart Magistrates Court on Complaints 6529/2017 and 6530/2017; and
- wholly suspended sentence of 14 days’ imprisonment, imposed on 27 June 2018 in the Hobart Magistrates Court on Complaint 11307/2016.
They are two offences of common assault and one of resisting police.
I have had regard to the decision Brett J in Moore v Salter [2018] TASSC 18 at [36] – [39] as to the relevant considerations which should properly be taken into account when considering whether it would be unjust to activate the sentence.
They include the nature and circumstances of the offences for which the sentence was originally imposed, and in my view, it is of decisive significance in the present case that he offence for which the sentences were originally imposed and suspended are of a very different nature.
However, although I am of the view that it would be unjust to activate any part of the suspended periods of imprisonment, the fact that the current offending occurred so soon after the suspension of those sentences causes me to think that I should extend the period of suspension in the order. However I am only able to do so to a day no later than 12 months after the day the defendant is convicted of the new offence, which is today. I believe that period to be November 2020. I do so even though it only extends the suspension by a little over two months. That is to say, I extend the period of suspension for a period of 12 months from today.