STATE OF TASMANIA v SEAN GREGORY RICHARDSON 19 NOVEMBER 2019
COMMENTS ON PASSING SENTENCE PEARCE J
Sean Richardson pleads guilty to possessing a firearm in contravention of a firearms prohibition order. On 18 February 2015 the defendant was served with a firearms prohibition order made on 3 December 2014 by a delegate of the Commissioner of Police under the Firearms 1996 Act, s 130. On 13 February 2019 the police went to an address in George Town. The defendant was present. In a car in the garage the police found a Voere .22 rifle. When the defendant was interviewed by the police he admitted that, on the day before the search, he was in the bush with a friend and had handled the rifle. He told the police that he was not aware that the rifle had been left in the car.
The Crown does not assert that the defendant was in possession of the rifle on the day it was found. However, by his plea of guilty, the defendant admits that he was in possession of the rifle when he had handled it in the bush on the previous day, and that his possession was in breach of the firearm prohibition order.
Firearms prohibition orders are made under the Firearms Act 1996, Part 8. If the Commissioner of Police forms the opinion that a person is unfit, in the public interest, to possess or use a firearm, the Commissioner may prohibit the person from possessing or using a firearm by serving such an order on that person. A person who is the subject of a firearms prohibition order must not possess or use a firearm in contravention of that order. Breach of an order may be prosecuted either summarily or as a crime. If prosecuted summarily as an offence under the Firearms Act, it is punishable by a fine not exceeding 50 penalty units or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years, or both. If prosecuted as a crime, as contrary to the Criminal Code, s 239C, the maximum sentence is at large. In this case I am dealing with the Code provision. The fact that Parliament has seen fit to make use or possession of a firearm in breach of a prohibition order a crime gives some indication of the seriousness with which breach is to be regarded, however, each case must be dealt with according to its individual circumstances.
It is not difficult to see why a firearm prohibition order was made and served on the defendant. He is aged 28. On 24 September 2015, he was sentenced to imprisonment for five years for an aggravated assault and wounding committed on 29 July 2013. On that occasion, motivated by revenge, he shot a hand gun from the passenger side of a moving car at a man on the footpath, only to hit and injure an innocent bystander. Justice Wood summarised his record in her sentencing comments in these terms. As a youth he committed offences of dishonesty and common assault. When only 15 he committed an aggravated robbery, and at 16 he committed an aggravated armed robbery resulting in a term of 18 months’ imprisonment six months suspended. He has committed numerous offences of dishonesty. Probation orders have proved unsuccessful and he has breached them on numerous occasions. He has more recent offences of violence, namely common assault: one committed in 2008, also in 2013, and 2014. He committed six breaches of family violence orders in 2014. He served three months in prison in 2014 and some 69 days at the end of 2014 and the beginning of 2015. He has prior convictions for firearms offences including recklessly discharge a firearm on 3 August 2008. He also has a history of drug offences.
The defendant was released on parole on 23 October 2017, but his parole was twice suspended and ultimately revoked because he continued to offend by committing offences including serious driving offences and, of course, this crime. It is an aggravating factor that the crime was committed while he was on parole. On 5 April 2019 he was sentenced to imprisonment by a magistrate. He has been in custody since 13 February following his arrest on the charge I am dealing with, but that period of custody has already been taken into account by the magistrate. The defendant became eligible to re-apply for parole on 4 September 2019 but parole has not yet been granted. His current sentences will expire on 16 September 2020.
The prolonged periods of detention and imprisonment served by Mr Richardson have not deterred him from offending. He is on a cycle of offending after release and re-imprisonment. While in prison this time he has had limited access to rehabilitation programs, but his behaviour in prison has been good. He has undertaken counselling which, according to his counsel, seems at last to be addressing the root causes of his offending, which arise from having been subject to neglect, abuse, violence and substance abuse from an early age. A report from his counsellor indicates that he responds positively to a safe environment and would benefit from support services.
As to the circumstances of this particular crime, it is not a serious example. The defendant’s possession of the gun was brief and the firearm belonged to someone else. The case is to be distinguished from one in which a person possesses a firearm intending to keep or use it, particularly if that is for a sinister purpose. Of course Mr Richardson was well aware he should have had nothing to do with any firearm, and he acknowledges that it was a serious matter for him to have breached the order in any respect. Because of the inherent seriousness of the crime a sentence of imprisonment is appropriate. He is assessed as suitable for a home detention order, but I have decided to not make such an order because I am not of the opinion that, in all the circumstances, it is appropriate. Added to that, he remains in custody. He is eligible for parole but it cannot be determined whether he will be granted parole or not, and I am not prepared to make an order of this nature in this case when it cannot immediately come into effect. It may be that a home detention order may assist his application for parole but I am not prepared to speculate about that.
Sean Richardson, you are convicted. You are sentenced to imprisonment for four months, cumulative to any sentence you are presently serving or liable to serve. I order that you not be eligible for parole until you have served half of that sentence.