HORTON, C C

STATE OF TASMANIA v COREY CRAIG HORTON       ESTCOURT J
COMMENTS ON PASSING SENTENCE                          19 JUNE 2020

The defendant, Corey Craig Horton, has pleaded guilty to one count of unlawfully setting fire to property. I have also agreed to deal with his plea of guilty to an associated summary offence of destroy property on complaint 50353/2020.

At approximately 12.00am on Friday 25 January 2020, the defendant went to a unit in Devonport. The property is owned by the Department of Communities Tasmania and is occupied by the complainant, or was.

The complainant invited the defendant inside and an argument ensued over money. The defendant became aggressive and took the complainant’s phone from her. She picked up her child and fled from the house. As she was running from the house she heard windows smashing. She went to a neighbour and told him that the defendant was smashing up her unit and had her mobile phone.

The neighbour went to the complainant’s address and as he approached the unit he could see flames. He went to the back of the unit, retrieved a hose from the backyard and attempted to put out the fire. After approximately thirty minutes he extinguished the fire. A friend of the complainant’s then called 000 and reported the incident.

Members of the Tasmanian Fire Service arrived at approximately 2.50am and examined the residence. The fire was limited to the lounge room, whereby a lounge chair was damaged, the floor area in front of the lounge chair was also damaged and a clothes rack was destroyed. There was smoke and heat damage throughout the entire unit, as well as smoke staining above one of the windows.

Various smashed external windows were discovered that were not caused by the fire (count 2 on complaint number 50353/2020).
Shortly after 7.15am the defendant attended the Devonport Police Station and told a police officer there that he had set fire to a girl’s towel and had broken a bathroom window.

The estimated cost of repairing the damage caused to the residence is $97,777. The insurer of the Department of Communities, Jardine Lloyd Thompson Pty Ltd, has thus far paid $13,317 for reparations to the premises.

Pursuant to s 68(1) of the Sentencing Act 1997, a compensation order is sought in favour of Jardine Lloyd Thompson Pty Ltd in an amount to be assessed. I note the application, and it is adjourned to a date to be fixed.

The defendant has an unenviable record of prior convictions, however there are no significant relevant prior matters.

Pursuant to s 27(1) of the Sentencing Act, the Crown makes an application to breach a suspended sentence of three months’ imprisonment imposed on 1 February 2019, largely for stealing offences, and a suspended sentence of four months imprisonment also imposed on 1 February 2019 for driving with an illicit drug in the body.

I am of the view that it would be unjust to activate either suspended sentence having regard in particular to the fact that the breach was within a matter of days of the end of the period of suspension, and further, that the sentences were imposed in relation to offending of a different character to the offences which breach the conditions of their suspension.

I take into account the matters submitted on the defendant’s behalf by his counsel, Mr Richardson, namely:

• The defendant, who is now 35 years old, was born and raised on the North West Coast, the elder of two children born to the union of Craig and Tanya Horton.
• In 1990 (aged 5 years) the defendant was placed in the care of his maternal grandmother.
• In 1994 he was declared a Ward of the State.
• His grandmother provided stability to the defendant’s life and he settled and formed a close bond with her.
• Unfortunately the defendant’s grandmother passed away in 1997, and the defendant thereafter spent time in various foster and group homes and ultimately was committed to Ashley Detention Centre.
• He had very little contact with either his mother or his father.
• His mother passed away in a house fire in 2005.

Not only did the defendant have difficult personal circumstances throughout his formative years but in November 2007 he was a passenger in a motor vehicle accident and sustained a traumatic brain injury, and other injuries. I have seen a report of Dr Janine Martin relating to those injuries and their consequences, written for the MAIB 7 on January 2008.

I have been told of a report by Psychologist William Doudle suggesting that the defendant would experience ongoing problems with his memory and mood in addition experiencing ongoing frustration, limited insight, poor judgement and other cognitive deficits. I have not seen that report.

I note that neither report purports to establish a causal link between the acquired brain injury and the offending, and Mr Richardson does not rely on any of the Verdins principles.

I accept Mr Richardson’s submission that the defendant is charged with unlawfully setting fire to property, and neither intended nor foresaw the risk of the building catching fire. He is not to be punished for the crime of arson, although the extent of the damage is a relevant consideration.

The defendant’s crime is not that of the more serious offence of arson and I note the intention involved in this lesser crime is quite different. It is nonetheless serious, motivated as it was. For his plea of guilty, the defendant is entitled to a genuine discount on an otherwise appropriate sentence.

I have read a victim impact statement from the complainant. Because of the fire she became homeless and was so for approximately 3 months. She is now re-established. Since the fire she has felt uneasy going to sleep of a night. She worries that there is someone out there who could do the same thing. She still becomes concerned about her house being secure. She worries that there is someone else out there who might hurt her.

The defendant is convicted of the crime of unlawfully setting fire to property and is also convicted of the summary offence of destroying property. I impose a single sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment back dated to 25 January 2020. The defendant is not to be eligible for parole until he has served one half of that sentence.