STATE OF TASMANIA v LEEANNE COLEMAN 18 OCTOBER 2019
COMMENTS ON PASSING SENTENCE BRETT J
Ms Coleman, you have pleaded guilty to one count of arson and one count of attempting to dishonestly acquire a financial advantage.
The arson was committed on 27 June 2016. The attempt to acquire the financial advantage commenced later that day and continued over some months. You and your co-accused were friends. Mr Shaw and Mr Wells lived together and had a close relationship. You had known Mr Shaw since childhood and you met Mr Wells through him. You became emotionally infatuated with Mr Wells, but he was not prepared to engage in a romantic relationship with you. It is put by your counsel that when these crimes were committed, you were heavily affected and influenced by your unrequited emotional attachment to Mr Wells.
On the day in question, Mr Wells and/or Mr Shaw set fire to Mr Shaw’s house. This was done with the intention of making a fraudulent insurance claim. It was intended that the fire should look as if it had been accidentally lit. The prosecution asserted that this plan had been in place for some time. The direct motive was to obtain the insurance money, but this was connected with Mr Shaw’s fear that other charges against him, would result in him being sent to prison.
In any event, the fire commenced at 6:17 pm, at about the time that the three of you left the house. The fire service attended and evidence which indicated that the fire had been deliberately lit was quickly discovered. In the end, the fire self-extinguished due to lack of oxygen, but it still caused substantial damage to the house and its contents. The damage has been estimated at approximately $150,000, of which $130,000 related to structural damage. The total cost of repairs has been subsequently estimated at $261,250.
Upon leaving the house after the fire had been lit, you and the two men went to your house. Later that night, Mr Shaw telephoned the insurer and made a claim against the insurance policy. The claim was investigated over a period of some months and ultimately denied by the insurance company.
The prosecution asserted in the sentencing proceedings that you were part of a joint criminal enterprise with the co-accused in relation to both crimes. Your counsel accepts that you are criminally responsible for the crimes, but on the basis that you abetted their commission without being part of any pre-existing plan or agreement to commit the offences. In particular, he asserts that your only prior knowledge of the intention of either man to set fire to the house, came from comments made by Mr Wells on prior occasions to the effect that he would burn Mr Shaw’s house down. These comments were made in the context of his angry response to unrelated conduct on the part of Mr Shaw, and when they were made, you did not believe that he was serious. On the day of the fire, just before leaving the house, you observed Mr Wells place some clothing dangerously close to the wood fire. You realised immediately that he was, in fact, acting on his threat to set fire to the house. Mr Shaw had gone outside just before this took place. You made a spontaneous decision then to turn a blind eye to what he was doing. By your plea, you accept that you intended to, and did actually, encourage Mr Wells in his act of setting fire to the house. You had a similar involvement in the attempt to dishonestly acquire the insurance money. You were aware when the call was made to the insurance company that Mr Wells had set fire to the house. You knew that the call was being made, and what its purpose was. It is not clear whether by this time you also realised that Mr Shaw was involved but at the very least you were aware that wittingly or unwittingly, he was making a fraudulent insurance claim. Your abetting of the attempt included lying to the insurance investigator. The prosecution does not necessarily accept this version of events, but did not dispute it by adducing evidence. As any greater involvement on your part would aggravate your culpability, the onus is on the prosecution to prove any such greater involvement beyond reasonable doubt. In the absence of such proof, I am required to act on the factual basis presented by your counsel.
You are 56 years of age. You have no prior convictions of relevance or significance. You have a strong employment record and you have children and grandchildren. Your counsel describes you as a family oriented person and submits that your conduct in this case was out of character. The effect of his submission is that your involvement in these crimes was heavily and irrationally influenced by your feelings for Mr Wells. He also submits that you did not stand to gain financially from the commission of these crimes. On the contrary, you have suffered actual financial loss because as a result of being charged with these crimes, your employment has come under significant threat and I have been told today that as a result you have actually resigned from that employment.
These crimes are extremely serious. The fraudulent conduct was blatantly dishonest. Insurance companies are particularly vulnerable to fraud of this nature. The arson was an extremely dangerous act. Setting fire to a structure, in particular, a house, involves potential danger from the spread of fire, and danger to those who may attempt to put out the fire, including the fire service. On the other hand, there are some factors which mitigate your culpability. You will be sentenced on the basis that you did not plan the fire or the fraud. You became involved spontaneously, although the mitigating effect of this must be balanced against the fact that you maintained the falsehood throughout the insurance investigation. Your involvement was limited to encouragement and silence, together with some subsequent lies to the police and the insurance company. Although your plea of guilty has come at a late stage, you should receive some limited mitigatory benefit from it. A matter which has considerable significance in mitigation is the fact that you indicated your willingness to give evidence against your co-accused at their imminent trial for these crimes. The significance of this is somewhat complicated by the prosecution’s concern about the truth of your version, but you should receive some credit in any event.
The seriousness of the crimes warrants the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment. Had you been involved in their commission as a principal offender, it is almost certain that you would have been required to serve some or all of the term of imprisonment, and that the term imposed would have been significantly greater than the one that I intend to impose on you. In my view, in view of the mitigating factors, including your offer to give evidence on behalf of the prosecution at the trial of the co-accused, it is appropriate to provide you with the opportunity to avoid actually serving the sentence which I intend to impose. Accordingly, I intend to wholly suspend the sentence. I will, however, provide for probation supervision as a condition of suspension, in accordance with the recommendation of community corrections.
The orders I make are as follows:
1 You are convicted of the crimes to which you have pleaded guilty.
2 You are sentenced to a term of 15 months’ imprisonment. The whole of the sentence will be suspended for a period of 18 months on the following conditions:
(a) That you are not to commit another offence punishable by imprisonment during that period.
(b) That you will be subject to the supervision of a probation officer. You must comply with this condition for a period of 12 months. That period will commence from today. The Court notes that the conditions referred to in s 24(5B) of the Sentencing Act apply to this condition. These include that you must report to a probation officer within 3 clear days of today. In addition to the core conditions, the order shall also include the following special conditions:
(i) you must, during the operational period of the order, attend educational and other programs as directed by a probation officer;
(ii) you must, during the operational period of the order, submit to the supervision of a probation officer as required by the probation officer;
(iii) you must, during the operational period of the order, submit to medical, psychological or psychiatric assessment or treatment as directed by a probation officer.
I make a compensation order in favour of ING and adjourn the application sine die.